Question 1: You mention a list of funded studies for threat characterization that you will compare proposal to. Can you provide that list?

<u>Answer 1:</u> No, the Government will not provide the list of funded studies for threat characterization that it will compare proposals to.

Question 2: You mention a rank of agents. Can you share your rank of agents?

Answer 2: No, the Government will not share our rank of agents.

Question 3: You don't mention pandemic influenza in the BAA. Are you interested in receiving proposals focused on influenza?

<u>Answer 3</u>: At this time, the Government is not interested in receiving proposals that are focused on influenza.

Question 4: Will the lead organization for the proposal matter: service lab, academia, big business, small business?

<u>Answer 4</u>: No, the Government is not concerned about whether the lead organization for the proposal be a service laboratory, a member of academia, a big business, or a small business concern.

Question 5: Will you adjust the proposal schedule to account for the time when you expect to receive your project funding?

<u>Answer 5</u>: The Government, as part of Amendment 00001 to BAA 13-008, adjusted the project schedule for the BAA by approximately 3 weeks. Vendors are hereby requested to review the updated Broad Agency Announcement that is attached to Amendment 00001.

Question 6: Viruses can be broadly divided into lipid (enveloped) and non non-lipid viruses. Is this the type of broad characterization acceptable to obtain data that could be related to threat agents? For example, Variola and influenza are both lipid viruses and would behave similarly when exposed to various environmental stresses and would be similarly protected by various protective factors.

<u>Answer 6</u>: Yes, the type of broad characterization is acceptable to obtain data that could be related to threat agents.

Question 7: TFA 1:

a. Can you tell us what "other agents" that DHS is interested in for this task?

Answer: DHS is interested in the following "other agents":

- Abrin
- Brucella suis
- Chlamydia psittaci
- Coxiella burnetii
- Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic fever virus
- Eastern equine encephalitis
- Rabies virus
- Ricin
- b. You mention non-high consequence pathogens in TFA4. Does that refer to a specific set of pathogens for that technical area or all of the "other agents" referred in the BAA non-high consequence pathogens?

Answer: For this BAA, non-high consequence pathogens include

- Abrin
- Brucella suis
- Chlamydia psittaci
- Coxiella burnetii
- Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic fever virus
- Eastern equine encephalitis
- Rabies virus
- Ricin

c. Are you concerned with stability in aerosols following longer storage?

<u>Answer</u>: The Government is concerned about the stability in aerosols following longer storage.

Question 8: TFA2:

a. Can you clarify what agents are of most interest in this task?

<u>Answer</u>: The Department of Homeland Security is interested in those agents for whom there is conflicting information or a lack of information in the open source literature.

b. Aerosol dosing and aerosol properties will make a difference that could have common themes among multiple agents. Are studies that evaluated this phenomenon of interest to DHS?

Answer: Yes, DHS is interested in those studies.

Question 9: TFA-4:

a. Studies can be designed that satisfy the questions asked in both TFA2 and TFA4. We would propose studies that vary aerosol dosing and aerosol properties. Is that of interest to you?

<u>Answer</u>: Yes, DHS would be interested in studies that vary aerosol dosing and aerosol properties.

 What are non-high consequence pathogens and what is the distinction between "agents not currently being focused on" mentioned in TFA 1 and TFA 2.

Answer: For this solicitation, non-high consequence pathogens include

- Abrin
- Brucella suis
- Chlamydia psittaci
- Coxiella burnetii

- Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic fever virus
- Eastern equine encephalitis
- Rabies virus
- Ricin

Question 10: TFA-5:

a. What is the purpose of characterization? Is it for detection? If so it is detect to warn or detect to treat?

<u>Answer</u>: Characterization so that relevant agent properties are understood to inform critical decisions related to biodefense planning & response.

b. The fluidization and stabilization process is common link between how agents within a class (virus, bacteria, or spore) would be prepared for aerosolization. Would DHS be interested in proposals that characterized the stabilizer and fluidizer as this would be indicative that a malicious bioaerosol was released?

<u>Answer</u>: Yes, DHS would be interested in proposals that characterized the stabilizer and the fluidizer.

Question 11: Does the proposed work under the TFAs require animal studies to be conducted?

<u>Answer 11</u>: No, not all the TFAs require animal studies. For those proposals that do not include animal work, a reasonable rational and methodology will need to be included on how the proposal will provide the desired data without the use of an animal model.

Question 12: Is it allowable to attach a face page to the white paper form?

Answer 12: No, it is not allowable to attach a face page to the white paper form.

Question 13: A prospective vendor intends to submit a proposal that will be marked For Official Use Only (FOUO). It is noted in the BAA that such proposals should be sent with password protection, but we do not see where a password can be communicated using the electronic submission portal. How do you communicate a password?

<u>Answer 13</u>: For those submissions that are password protected, the prospective vendor should provide the password to the Contracting Officer via email at <u>Aaron.Ford@hq.dhs.gov</u>. It is important to note that the vendor should identify in the email the name of the submission and the vendor name.